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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at investigating some of the critical issues highlighted by the sovereign debt crisis in 
European Union (EU) Member States (MS). The goal is twofold: 
1) Quantify the increase in the risks of the EU banking systems due to haircuts of sovereign 
debts of some EU Member States, which have been particularly touched by the sovereign 
crisis; 
2) evaluate and compare the policy options which have been adopted to address the issue.  
The first goal is achieved by estimating the increase in the banks Probability to Default (PD), due to 
the haircuts in sovereingn debts, through a further development of the SYMBOL model to estimate 
the PDs by numerical inversion of the Basel FIRB formula for minimum capital requirements. 
For the second objective the measures within the Basel III Accord, which among the others increases 
the quality and quantity of capital that banks should set aside to cover from unexpected losses, are 
compared with the agreement on bank recapitalisation and funding reached by the European Council 
in October 2011, which responded to the urgent consequences of the sovereign bonds crisis in the 
EU.  
The analysis is performed on the 65 large EU banking groups identified by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) for the capitalisation exercise..  
Results show that the haircuts on sovereign debts of EU MS in crisis would heavily worsen the 
stability of their banking systems but could also sometimes affect financial stability of other EU 
countries. We also show that the creation of a temporary capital buffer in the form of a capital target, 
necessitated by the exceptional circumstances prevailing in some EU MS, represent a step forward to 
Basel III rules. 
 
 
Keywords: banking stability, sovereign bonds, systemic risk.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last few years the EU MS have been facing two interrelated crises: a banking crisis, stemming 
from losses in capital markets as well as from property markets in some EU countries; and a 
sovereign debt crisis driven by the effects of the recession on the budget and on the re-assessment of 
sovereign risk by financial operators, the transfers necessary to support the finanial sector, and in 
some cases very poor fiscal management over a number of years (Blundell-Wignall and Slovik, 2011). 
A number of policy initiatives have been initiated to address these crises, both on the fiscal and on the 
banking side. On the fiscal side, the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact has reinforced 
surveillance aiming at the medium-term. The creation of the European Financial Stability Facility 
followed by the creation of the European Stability Mechanism allow supporting euro area member 
states facing sovereign crisis and systemic banking difficulties. Further initiatives have been taking to 
tackle the difficulties of the banking sector, in the short-term with the intervention of the European 
Central Bank and in the medium term with the creation of the banking union and of a reinforced 
regulation. Among this actions, the banking sector has been particularly concerned by the new Basel 
Accord (BCBS (2011)) and the European Council agreement on bank recapitalisation and funding 
(EURO Summit (2011), EBA (2011)), which we analyse in the present paper.  
The present performs two different exercises. First, it investigates the impact on the European 
banking systems of haircuts of sovereign debts of selected EU MS. Are chosen the MS which have 
been mostly hit by the turbulence in the sovereign markets, namely Greece, Italy, Spain, Italy, Ireland 
and Portugal. The existing SYMBOL model (see De Lisa et al. (2011)) is furtherly developed in order 
to assess the default probability of banking groups with respect to sovereign haircuts.  
Second, the exercise compares two policy options relative to banks recapitalization, following the new 
Basel agreement of 2012 and the corresponding recapitalization needs. 
The Basel III Framework, signed in 2010, stipulates that banks should hold more and better capital in 
order to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic 
stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real 
economy. In particular banks are required to build adequate Counter-Ciclycal Buffers (CCB) above 
the minimum, that can be drawn down in periods of stress. The total minimum capital requirement 
including the CCB raises from 8% to 10.5% of the Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs). The package also 
includes a revision for a stricter definition of regulatory capital, and higher weights for some categories 
of risk. These new rules should be implemented within 1st of January 2019, after a phase-in period. 
As an urgent answer to the severe consequences of the sovereign debt crisis, which turned out well 
before the foreseen Basel III implementation, on 26 October 2011 the Members of the European 
Council reached an agreement on bank recapitalisation and funding to create a temporary capital 
buffer of 9% Core Tier 1 ratio by 30 June 2012. The buffer is intended to tackle the extraordinary 
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pressure on some Euro-area sovereigns and the related impact on the cost and availability of bank 
funding.1 
The remaining of this reports develops as it follows. Section 2 presents the dataset used for the 
analysis. Section 3 focuses on the impact on EU large banking groups of haircuts of sovereign bonds 
of selected countries and presents the methodology used. Section 4 analyzes the policy options 
considered to address the issue. Section 5 reports data on the foreign exposures of the european 
banking groups before and after the exercise. 
 
2. The Dataset 
The exercises are performed on the sample of banks which participated in the 2011 EBA stress test, 
except for the subset of small non cross-border banks that has been exempted from the exercise. 
Annex 1 presents the list of the groups included.  
Our analysis is based on the following two sets of data: 
• Balance sheet data from Bankscope as of December 2010. In particular for the analysis of 
capital levels and for SYMBOL estimations the variables capital requirements, total capital and 
total assets are used. These data are summarized per country in Table 1. The table 
aggregates per country the data for the considerd 65 EU banking groups consolidated in the 
country of the parent. Figures refer to consolidated accounts.  
• Sovereign debt exposures of single group exposures as reported in the European Banking 
Authority (EBA, formerly CEBS) Capital Exercise 2011 (EBA 2011b) of October 2011. Data on 
the exposition of EU banks to government bonds are normally not published, but the 
disclosure of the capital exercise held by the EBA includes an important cross-section of the 
exposures of each banking group by counterpart MS, maturity and accounting category. Data 
are presented in Table 2 (values) and 3 (incidence to Tier1). Table 3 and Graph 1 refer to 
September 2011.  
The EBA Basel III monitoring exercise 2011 (EBA 2011a) is used to  estimate the effects of Basel III 
rules. Concerning the rule proposed by the Council, we report the sovereign exposures and haircuts 
estimated by the EBA in executing the Council mandate, for each of the considerd banking groups, on 
some selected countries sovereign debts (ES, GR, IT, IE, PT). The impact the introduction of the new 
Basel III rules framework is monitored semi-annually by both the Basel Committee at a global level 
and the EBA at the European level, using data provided by participating banks on a voluntary and 
confidential basis, Results of the EBA monitoring exercise are summarised in a report (EBA (2011a)) 
                                                 
1  This decision followed the warning of the September 2011 of the European Systemic Risk Board, which recognized that 
sovereign risks and funding vulnerabilities within the EU banking sector could threaten financial stability in the EU as a 
whole and urged supervisors to coordinate efforts to strengthen bank capital, taking into account the need for transparent 
and consistent valuation of sovereign exposures . 
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which makes use of consolidated data of 158 European banks (48 Group 1 banks and 110 Group 2 
banks) as of 30 June 2011. 
2.1 Data description 
Data on exposures show that the sovereign bonds are mainly held within the home country banking 
systems but that there are also relevant exposures of other MS. For instance LU and BE are rather 
exposed to IT sovereign bonds and CY is exposed to the risk of GR default. There are also non 
negligible exposures of FR, PT, DE and UK to sovereign bonds of the considered countries.  
 
Table 1: Bankscope sample description (million Euro). Data are consolidated and aggregated per country as of 
December 2010. Source: Bankscope 
Number of groups 
Country 
Group 12 Group 2 
RWA under 
Basel II definition 
(m€) 
Total assets 
(m€) 
Capital under 
Basel II definition 
(% RWA) 
Tier 1 under 
Basel II 
(m€) 
AT 2 1  242,475  383,576 13.4%  24,023 
BE 2 0  252,545  843,458 15.5%  32,234 
CY 0 2  53,904  85,218 11.8%  5,643 
DE 12 1  1,263,206  5,153,876 15.4%  152,932 
DK 2 2  179,612  655,963 17.6%  28,025 
ES 5 0  1,374,409  2,514,380 12.7%  134,752 
FI 1 0  42,728  83,969 12.8%  5,454 
FR 4 0  1,910,772  5,909,518 12.7%  202,816 
HU 1 0  26,774  35,083 17.5%  3,753 
IE 2 1  193,622  388,394 10.1%  13,592 
IT 5 0  1,085,485  2,098,238 12.6%  97,196 
LU 0 1  10,687  37,935 24.0%  1,396 
MT 0 1  3,381  6,335 15.0%  354 
NL 3 1  731,277  2,044,126 14.8%  91,002 
NO 1 0  106,168  208,161 12.9%  10,733 
PL 1 0  35,670  42,837 12.5%  4,030 
PT 3 1  231,395  354,560 11.4%  20,718 
SE 4 0  494,117  1,255,548 12.0%  51,406 
SI 0 2  20,579  23,755 10.2%  1,387 
UK 4 0  2,313,352  6,446,983 15.3%  288,080 
TOTAL 52 13 10,572,157 28,571,913 13.8% 1,169,526 
                                                 
2 In the present exercise Group 1 banks are those banks that have Tier I capital in excess of 3 b€. 
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Table 2: Banking groups expositions to some countries’ sovereign debts, by country in m€ as of September 
2011. Source: EBA 
 m€ 
Country Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
AT  127   53   1,050   27   97  
BE  4,267   376   18,448   1,993   2,606  
CY  4,926   361   103   -    -    
DE  6,350   893   30,009   3,973   19,173  
DK  58   148   1,167   35   540  
ES  254   -    6,948   3,388   167,579  
FI  1   41   0   0   -    
FR  7,519   1,794   41,785   3,567   11,418  
HU  -     -    -    -    -    
IE  21   12,455   241   96   30  
IT  1,466   193   156,043   292   3,768  
LU  82   -    1,396   143   173  
MT  7   7   6   2   -    
NL  870   370   4,522   659   1,323  
NO  -     -    -    -    -    
PL  -     -    -    -    -    
PT  1,020   547   959   22,745   96  
SE  73   -    102   29   17  
SI  5   9   25   3   15  
UK  1,417   845   22,545   1,839   7,313  
Total  28,463   18,093   285,350   38,791   214,148  
 
Table 3: Banking groups expositions to some countries’ sovereign debts, by country as a % of Tier1 capital  m€ 
as of September 2011. Source: EBA 
 % of Basel II Tier1 Capital 
Country Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
AT 0.5% 0.2% 4.4% 0.1% 0.4% 
BE 13.2% 1.2% 57.2% 6.2% 8.1% 
CY 87.3% 6.4% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
DE 4.2% 0.6% 19.6% 2.6% 12.5% 
DK 0.2% 0.5% 4.2% 0.1% 1.9% 
ES 0.2% 0.0% 5.2% 2.5% 124.4% 
FI 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
FR 3.7% 0.9% 20.6% 1.8% 5.6% 
HU 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
IE 0.2% 91.6% 1.8% 0.7% 0.2% 
IT 1.5% 0.2% 160.5% 0.3% 3.9% 
LU 5.9% 0.0% 100.0% 10.3% 12.4% 
MT 2.0% 2.0% 1.7% 0.6% 0.0% 
NL 1.0% 0.4% 5.0% 0.7% 1.5% 
NO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
PL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
PT 4.9% 2.6% 4.6% 109.8% 0.5% 
SE 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 
SI 0.4% 0.6% 1.8% 0.2% 1.1% 
UK 0.5% 0.3% 7.8% 0.6% 2.5% 
Total 2.4% 1.5% 24.4% 3.3% 18.3% 
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Figure 1: Exposition of MS to the sovereign bonds of the 5 selected counties (GR, IE, IT, PT, ES). The size of 
the bubbles reflect the amount of exposition. 
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It is worth stressing that the expositions reported in Table 3 are weighted averages of the expositions 
of each banking group in the considered country, and that values aggregated per country are much 
smoother than the effects on individual banking groups. As an example, in Table 4 we specify for 
each MS the number of banks with exposure larger than 25% of the Tier1 capital. 
Table 4: Banking groups expositions to some countries’ sovereign debts for over 25% of Tier1 capital as of 
September 2011. Source: EBA 
Number of banks with exposure on sovereign debts  
higher than 25% of Basel II Tier1 Capital Country Number of banks Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
AT 3      
BE 2   1   
CY 2 2     
DE 13   4  4 
DK 4      
ES 5     5 
FI 1      
FR 4   1   
HU 1      
IE 3      
IT 5  3    
LU 1   5   
MT 1   1   
NL 4      
NO 1      
PL 1      
PT 4    4  
SE 4   1   
SI 2      
UK 4      
Total 65 2 3 13 4 9 
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3. Effect of the haircut on banks’ default probability 
The first exercise is to estimate of the potential effects on financial stability of the sovereign crisis, and 
in particular of possible haircuts on sovereign debts. These effects are proxied evaluating the 
variation of the default probability for each banking group in our sample caused by haircuts in the 
sovereign debt. 
This is achieved using the SYMBOL model (Systemic Model of Banking Originated Losses). The 
model estimates the losses deriving from bank defaults on the basis of the Basel II FIRB (Foundation 
Internal Ratings Based) formula, which is commonly used to analyse banks' riskiness by regulators. 
The model is here further developed to compute numerically the banks’ probability to default by 
finding the actual capital coverage of the losses probability distribution which allows to avoid 
performing Monte Carlo simulations.  
 
3.1. Methodology 
The SYMBOL model simulates distribution probabilities of individual bank credit losses for each bank 
in a banking system Such a distribution is simulated  via a Monte Carlo simulation and according to 
the Basel Foundation Internal Ratings Based (FIRB) function loss distribution. The loss distribution of 
each bank is calibrated to the credit risk implied by its regulatory capital requirement. 
In the present simulation exercise Monte Carlo simulations are replaced by direct computation of the 
loss probability distributions of the individual banks. This presents the advantage that simulation 
errors are avoided and computation is evidently faster. 
The model operates in two steps: the first step is the estimation of an average default probability for 
the assets of any individual bank, by means of the features of the Basel FIRB function; the second 
step numerically performs the estimation of the bank’s probability to default.  
These two steps are based on the following: 
(1) The average assets probability to default (APD) of each bank i ˆ iAPD  is estimated as the PD that 
allows the actual value of the capital requirement for that specific bank, Ki (extracted from 
balance-sheet data), to be equal to its numerically calculated value. The latter is obtained from the 
Basel FIRB formula, setting the other variables, i.e. loss given default (LGD), maturity (M) and 
size (S), to their standard values: 
( )ˆ ˆ: | 0.45 2.5 50i i iAPD K APD LGD M S K= = = =  
 12
( ) ( ), , , , , , 1,...,i in in in in in in in in in in
i
K PD LGD M S C PD LGD M S A n N= × =∑  
where iK is the sum of the capital allocation parameter (Cin) of each exposure n of bank i multiplied 
by its amount Ain .3 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
1
,1, , , 0.999
1 , 1 ,
1 2.5 1 1.5 1.06
in in
in in in in in in in in in
in in in in
in in in
R PD S
C PD LGD M S LGD N PD N PD LGD
R PD S R PD S
M B PD B PD
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= × + − × ×
− −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤× + − × − × ×⎣ ⎦
 
where: 
( ) ( ) 20.11852 0.05478lnin in inB PD PD⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  
and 
( )
50 50
50 50
51 1, 0.12 0.24 1 0.04
451 1
in inPD PD
in
in in in
Se eR PD S
e e
− −
− −
⎡ ⎤ −− − ⎡ ⎤
= + − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
− − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
(2) The second step is realised via the numerical estimation of the Bank’s Probability to Default 
(BPD), obtained using the calibrated ˆ iAPD and the actual capital of the bank iCAP .  
As the FIRB formula is based on a VaR, it is implicitly based on a probability discìribution for 
losses. The capital covers the losses up to the VaR threshold, but if losses are higher than capital 
the bank is in default. Typically banks hold more capital than required, and, evidenltly, the higher 
the actual capital, the higher the part of the losses probability distribution coverage.  
So, the bank’s probability to default, BPD, can be estimated as the part of the bank’s losses 
probability distribution not covered by its capital. It is obtained inverting once more the FIRB 
formula, this time fixing APDi and CAPi and numerically finding the value of BPDi that verifies the 
equation: 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 1
1
ˆ , 501 ˆ ˆ ˆ0.45 1 0.45
ˆ ˆ1 , 50 1 , 50
ˆ1 1.5 1.06
i
i i i i
i i
i
R APD
CAP N N PD N BPD APD
R APD R APD
B APD
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
= + − − ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
− ×
 
where 
                                                 
3 See De Lisa et al., (2011) for a detailed explanation of all terms in this representation of the FIRB approach. 
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1,...,i H= (banks), iCAP  is the actual capital and iBPD  is the probability to default of the bank i.  
The third step consist in computing the impact of sovereign haircuts.As in the EBA exercise, the 
actual available capital in case of a haircut on sovereign bonds is considered to be proxied as the 
actual capital of the bank minus the reduction in value of the considered bonds. So, the capital to 
be considered after the haircut is i iCAP HC−  and after the haircut, we have: 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 1
1
ˆ , 501 ˆ ˆ ˆ0.45 1 0.45
ˆ ˆ1 , 50 1 , 50
ˆ1 1.5 1.06
i
i i i i i
i i
i
R APD
CAP HC N N APD N BPD APD
R APD R APD
B APD
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
′
− = + − − ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
− ×
where  ˆ iBPD′  is the probability to default of the bank i after the haircut.  
 
3.2. Results for haircuts effects estimation 
The possible effects on a banking system of haircuts on sovereign debts are investigated following 
the methodology described in Section 3.1.  
It is assumed that the haircut results in a reduction of bank’s capital equivalent to the haircut fraction 
of 15% or 30% of the exposure. This is meant to represent an haircut in sovereigns of the same 
proportion, which is translated into a cut in the capital of banks of the same amount. This reduction in 
banks' capital generates an increase in banks' default probabilities (a reduced capacity on their side 
to cope with losses stemming from normal activity).  
The following points should be considered when reading the results: 
1. The exercise does not take into account possible systemic effects of contagion between banks, 
e.g.  via the interbank market.   
2. No information is so far available on the exposures of other (non-banks) investors to the 
considered government bonds. These investors are most likely investment and pension funds 
and insurance companies. No information is available on the relationship between these 
financial operators and banks. 
3. Important assumptions are used in SYMBOL; the model does not take into account the rating of 
the bank, eventual provisions or the possibility that banks can raise capital. 
4. The effects on single banks can be underestimated as all values considered refers to the whole 
group, and concentration of exposures within some banks of the groups are not considered.5. 
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Table 5 shows the effect of the haircut of some countries sovereign bonds on the default probability of 
the considered banking groups. Results are presented, aggregated by country showing the results for 
the two assumptions of an haircut of 15% and 30% respectively.4 
As expected, the major effect of the haircut is within the country. Spill-over important effects can be 
observed in the case of a haircut on Greek sovereign debts for Cyprus banks, and Italian sovereign 
debts for Belgian and Luxembourg banks. The effect is clearly non linear in the amount of the haircut, 
due to the threshold effect exercised by the capital level of the bank owning the sovereigns. 
It is worth reminding that, as reported in the final part of Section 2 for exposures, results aggregated 
per country are much smoother than the effects on individual banking groups  
                                                 
4  Under these assumptions the variation in the PD depends solely on the size of the exposure. Potentail differences 
in the haircut that could be applied in the considered countries, which would depend on market evaluation and 
governance among the others, are not taken into account. 
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Table 5: Weighted average probability of default of the banking groups in each country under possible haircuts (15% and 30% of the nominal value) of some 
countries sovereign bonds. The average is weighted on total assets. 
GR IE IT PT ES 
 No haircut 15% 30% 15% 30% 15% 30% 15% 30% 15% 30% 
AT 0.130% 0.131% 0.131% 0.131% 0.131% 0.134% 0.137% 0.131% 0.131% 0.131% 0.131% 
BE 0.091% 0.100% 0.111% 0.092% 0.092% 0.136% 0.217% 0.096% 0.100% 0.100% 0.095% 
CY 0.094% 0.166% 0.315% 0.098% 0.102% 0.095% 0.097% 0.094% 0.094% 0.094% 0.094% 
DE 0.099% 0.101% 0.103% 0.099% 0.100% 0.107% 0.117% 0.100% 0.101% 0.112% 0.105% 
DK 0.057% 0.057% 0.057% 0.057% 0.057% 0.058% 0.060% 0.057% 0.057% 0.058% 0.057% 
ES 0.169% 0.169% 0.169% 0.169% 0.169% 0.173% 0.178% 0.171% 0.174% 0.947% 0.358% 
FI 0.157% 0.157% 0.157% 0.158% 0.159% 0.157% 0.157% 0.157% 0.157% 0.157% 0.157% 
FR 0.155% 0.157% 0.160% 0.155% 0.156% 0.170% 0.188% 0.156% 0.157% 0.164% 0.159% 
HU 0.050% 0.050% 0.050% 0.050% 0.050% 0.050% 0.050% 0.050% 0.050% 0.050% 0.050% 
IE 0.292% 0.292% 0.293% 0.437% 0.708% 0.295% 0.297% 0.293% 0.294% 0.293% 0.292% 
IT 0.168% 0.169% 0.170% 0.168% 0.168% 0.410% 2.942% 0.168% 0.169% 0.175% 0.171% 
LU 0.011% 0.011% 0.011% 0.011% 0.011% 0.016% 0.025% 0.011% 0.011% 0.012% 0.011% 
MT 0.042% 0.043% 0.043% 0.043% 0.043% 0.042% 0.043% 0.042% 0.042% 0.042% 0.042% 
NL 0.102% 0.103% 0.104% 0.103% 0.103% 0.106% 0.109% 0.103% 0.104% 0.105% 0.103% 
NO 0.153% 0.153% 0.153% 0.153% 0.153% 0.153% 0.153% 0.153% 0.153% 0.153% 0.153% 
PL 0.192% 0.192% 0.192% 0.192% 0.192% 0.192% 0.192% 0.192% 0.192% 0.192% 0.192% 
PT 0.229% 0.238% 0.247% 0.232% 0.236% 0.233% 0.238% 0.454% 1.056% 0.230% 0.230% 
SE 0.183% 0.183% 0.183% 0.183% 0.183% 0.183% 0.183% 0.183% 0.183% 0.183% 0.183% 
SI 0.163% 0.163% 0.163% 0.163% 0.164% 0.164% 0.166% 0.163% 0.163% 0.164% 0.164% 
UK 0.092% 0.092% 0.092% 0.092% 0.092% 0.096% 0.100% 0.092% 0.092% 0.094% 0.093% 
 0.128% 0.130% 0.132% 0.130% 0.134% 0.154% 0.349% 0.132% 0.140% 0.202% 0.147% 
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4. Analysis of adopted policy options 
This section aims at comparing two policy options which have been proposed to address the fragilities 
of the EU financial sector and the issue of sovereign bonds held by financial institutions. The focus is 
on the comparison of the recapitalization required for the banks to comply with the proposed options. 
 
4.1. The Basel III package 
The Basel III package requires, among other things, a stricter definition and higher level of capital, 
and higher weights for some assets categories, that results in higher RWA, in order to increase the 
resilience of the banking sector to financial shocks. In the course of its regular monitoring EBA has 
estimated the average change in total capital and RWA expected from the implementation of the 
Basel III framework (seeTable 6) . These estimations are used in the present exercise to assess the 
proposed policy options  
Table 6: Average estimated change in total capital ratio and RWA due to Basel III. Source: EBA (2011a) 
 Group 1 Group 2 
Average Tier1 capital ratio as of 30 June 2011 11.9% 10.9% 
Average Tier1 capital ratio under Basel III  6.7% 7.4% 
Change in RWA due to Basel III  21.2% 6.9% 
 
To measure the recapitalization needs implied by the implementation of Basel III, the following 
scenarios are constructed: 
1) Scenario 1.1, which will be labeled as Basel II, where the new Basel III definition of capital and 
RWA are applied and banks satisfy the Basel II capital ratios. The effects of implementing the 
new Basel III definitions are the ones estimated by EBA in their Quantitative Impact Study 
(EBA (2012a)), i.e. banks’ total capital and RWA are adjusted using estimated average 
changes presented in Table 6. Data in Table 6 are used to estimate the increase in value of 
the RWA, and the reduced value of Tier1 capital as consequent to the new definitions. This 
scenario can be thought of as representing the situation of the EU banking systems at the 
beginning of the financial crisis, where risks where underestimated and the quality of capital 
was very poor.   
2) Scenario 1.2, which will be labeled as Basel III 8%, where the new Basel III definition of capital 
and RWA are applied and banks are assumed to recapitalize to reach at least a minimum 
capital requirement equal to 8% of their RWA and a minimum Tier1 capital of 6.5%.  
3) Scenario 1.3, which will be labeled as Basel III 10.5%, where the new Basel III definition of 
capital and RWA are applied and banks are assumed to recapitalize to reach at least a 
minimum capital requirement equal to 10.5% of their RWA and a minimum Tier1 capital of 8%.  
Table 7 shows RWA, Tier1 and Tier1 ratios, under scenarios 1.1 to 1.3 and recapitalization needs, 
estimated comparing the amount of capital in scenario 1.2 and 1.3 with the ones in scenario 1.1. 
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Table 7: RWA, Tier 1 and Tier 1 ratios under the various scenarios. 
 Data as of 31/12/2010 Scenario 1.1 (Basel II) 
Scenario 1.2 
(Basel III 8%) 
Scenario 1.3 
(Basel III 10.5%) 
 RWA (m€) 
Tier1 
(m€) 
Tier1 
ratio 
 Basel II 
RWA 
(m€) Tier1 (m€) 
Tier1 
ratio 
Tier1 
(m€) 
Tier1 
ratio 
Tier1 
(m€) 
Tier1 
ratio 
Recap 
needs 
Scenario 
1.2 vs  
Scenario 
1.1 
(m€) 
Recap 
needs 
Scenario 1.3 
vs  
Scenario 1.1 
(m€) 
AT  242,475   24,023  9.9%  289,892   16,506  5.7%  17,502  6.04%  24,641  8.50%  995   8,134  
BE  252,545   32,234  12.8%  306,085   21,996  7.2%  21,996  7.19%  26,017  8.50%  -    4,021  
CY  53,904   5,643  10.5%  57,623   4,095  7.1%  4,095  7.11%  4,898  8.50%  -    803  
DE  1,263,204   152,932  12.1%  1,528,476   104,469  6.8%  105,633  6.91%  133,013  8.70%  1,163   28,544  
DK  179,612   28,025  15.6%  214,348   19,268  9.0%  19,268  8.99%  19,505  9.10%  -    238  
ES  1,374,409   134,752  9.8%  1,665,784   91,953  5.5%  99,947  6.00%  141,592  8.50%  7,994   49,638  
FI  42,728   5,454  12.8%  51,786   3,722  7.2%  3,722  7.19%  4,402  8.50%  -    680  
FR  1,910,772   202,816  10.6%  2,315,856   138,399  6.0%  142,015  6.13%  196,848  8.50%  3,616   58,449  
HU  26,774   3,753  14.0%  32,450   2,561  7.9%  2,561  7.89%  2,758  8.50%  -    197  
IE  193,622   13,592  7.0%  232,409   9,348  4.0%  14,151  6.09%  19,755  8.50%  4,803   10,407  
IT  1,085,485   97,196  9.0%  1,315,607   66,325  5.0%  78,936  6.00%  111,827  8.50%  12,611   45,502  
LU  10,687   1,396  13.1%  11,425   1,013  8.9%  1,013  8.87%  1,013  8.87%  -    -    
MT  3,381   354  10.5%  3,615   257  7.1%  257  7.10%  307  8.50%  -    50  
NL  731,277   91,002  12.4%  883,143   62,202  7.0%  62,505  7.08%  75,963  8.60%  303   13,761  
NO  106,168   10,733  10.1%  128,675   7,324  5.7%  7,721  6.00%  10,937  8.50%  396   3,613  
PL  35,670   4,030  11.3%  43,232   2,750  6.4%  2,750  6.36%  3,675  8.50%  -    925  
PT  231,395   20,718  9.0%  276,727   14,241  5.1%  16,660  6.02%  23,522  8.50%  2,419   9,281  
SE  494,117   51,406  10.4%  598,869   35,079  5.9%  37,391  6.24%  50,904  8.50%  2,312   15,825  
SI  20,579   1,387  6.7%  21,999   1,007  4.6%  1,320  6.00%  1,870  8.50%  313   863  
UK  2,313,352   288,080  12.5%  2,803,783   196,582  7.0%  196,582  7.01%  238,322  8.50%  -    41,740  
Total 10,572,155 1,169,526 11.1% 12,781,783   799,096  6.3%  836,022  6.54%  1,091,768  8.54%  36,926   292,672  
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4.2. Effects of recent EU Council decisions 
Following the crisis of sovereign debts in some EU MS, in its meeting, the EU Council agreed on 
requiring a significantly higher capital ratio of 9 % of the highest quality capital and after accounting 
for market valuation of sovereign debt exposures, to create a temporary buffer, which is justified by 
the exceptional circumstances. 
Table 8 shows the results of the aggregated impact of this new rule, as reported by the EBA, which 
calculated the recapitalization needs for each group.  
It is worth noting that the variables considered for this exercise (the “highest quality capital” is 
technically the “Core Tier1”) are not those considered in the Basel III rules (that refers to the “Tier1”), 
so the two regulatory interventions are not immediately comparable, but need to be evaluated through 
the effects they have on the banking groups.   
The numbers in Table 8 are obtained as follows.  
In the EBA implementation of the EC decision, the current level of Core Tier1 capital held by banks is 
the base reference considered for estimations. Shortfalls to 9% of RWA as Core Tier1 for each 
banking group are then quantified (first column in Table 8). 
Then, given the sovereign debt exposures, the sovereign buffers of each banking group are 
estimated. These additional capital buffers are reported in column 3 of Table 8. 
The last two columns of Table 8 present for comparison purposes the recapitalization needs of the 
Basel III package based on the value of total capital, corrected for the new Basel III definitions of 
capital and risk weighted asset and introduction of the Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB). These 
recapitalisation needs are obtained in three steps:  
(i) applying to the level of Tier1 capital as of December 2010 the reduction in Tier1 capital 
due to the adoption of new definitions, estimated by EBA on the basis of its Quantitative 
Impact Study; 
(ii) applying to the level of RWA as of December 2010 the increase due to the adoption of 
new definitions, estimated by EBA on the basis of its Quantitative Impact Study; 
(iii) calculating the amount of Tier1 capital necessary to reach a minimum ratio of 6% (no 
CCB) or of 8.5% (CCB included). 
Data in Table 8 show that for almost all countries the Council decision is in between the Basel III 8% 
(Tier 1 6%) and Basel III 10.5% (Tier 1 8.5%) estimated values, so it results in a large anticipation of 
the implementation of the Basel III package. 
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Table 8: Country recapitalization needs under the new rule approved in October 2011 by the EU Council vs 
Basel III  
EBA capital exercise Basel III estimated effects  
Country Core Tier1 shortfall to 9% before 
application of 
sovereign capital 
buffer (m€) 
Sovereign 
capital buffer 
(m€) 
Overall Shortfall 
after including 
sovereign capital 
buffer 
Tier1 shortfall 
to 6%  
under Basel III 
(m€) 
Tier1 shortfall to 
8.5%  
under Basel III 
(m€) 
AT  3,812   112   3,923   995   8,134  
BE  1,539   4,774   6,313   -     4,021  
CY  1,075   2,457   3,531   -     803  
DE  7,431   7,563   13,107   1,163   28,544  
DK  -     22   -     -     238  
ES  19,610   6,561   26,170   7,994   49,638  
FI  -     -     -     -     680  
FR  4,881   3,512   7,324   3,616   58,449  
HU  -     33   -     -     197  
IE  -     815   -     4,803   10,407  
IT  8,624   9,674   15,366   12,611   45,502  
LU  -     -     -     -     -    
MT  -     1   -     -     50  
NL  -     183   159   303   13,761  
NO  1,520   -     1,520   396   3,613  
PL  -     -     -     -     925  
PT  3,232   3,718   6,950   2,419   9,281  
SE  -     2   -     2,312   15,825  
SI  320   4   320   313   863  
UK  -     -     -     -     41,740  
TOTAL 52,043 39,428 84,685  36,926   292,672  
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5. Aftermath: European banks’ exposures on European countries public sector rebalancing 
After the sovereign crisis and the EU council intervention the exposures of the different MS to EU 
sovereign bonds has changed, as shown in Table 9.. A relevant reallocation of the exposures is 
evident from the following table. 
While the overall amount of euro area bonds in the capital of euro area banks has grown by 185 b€ in 
2011, the composition in terms of countries has changed. The most relevant reductions in sovereign 
hold by bank concern Italy (-56 bn), Spain (-38 bn), Greece (- 22 bn), while the most important 
increases concern France (+35 bn), Finland (+29 bn) and Luxembourg (+27 bn).  
 
Table 9: Exposures of EU banks to sovereign debts. Source: BIS, quarterly review, Table 9E: Consolidated 
foreign claims and other potential exposures - ultimate risk basis 
  Country 
Exposures at 
31/12/2010 
(m€) 
Exposures at 
31/12/2011 
(m€) 
Variation  
(m€) Variation % 
AT 37,718 37,071 -647 -2% 
BE 66,202 69,085 2,882 +4% 
CZ 29,437 38,527 9,089 +31% 
DK 11,760 9,151 -2,609 -22% 
FI 16,604 45,662 29,059 +175% 
FR 101,902 137,263 35,360 +35% 
DE 226,427 205,653 -20,774 -9% 
GR 39,042 16,383 -22,659 -58% 
IE 11,472 8,402 -3,070 -27% 
IT 164,793 108,562 -56,232 -34% 
LU 10,701 37,919 27,219 +254% 
NE 45,984 71,605 25,621 +56% 
NO 16,697 8,439 -8,258 -49% 
PO 53,130 48,849 -4,280 -8% 
PT 24,197 18,312 -5,885 -24% 
ES 65,786 27,166 -38,619 -59% 
SE 5,143 3,207 -1,936 -38% 
UK 64,542 67,963 3,421 +5% 
All countries 2,205,011 2,389,750 +184,740 +8% 
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Annex 1  
List of banks included in the exercise and recapitalisation needs as a consequence of possible haircuts. 
Key: 
Needed:  the actual capital, after the Basel III estimated corrections is not sufficient to reach  the 
6% minimum required. So in any case a recapitalisation is needed. 
No: the actual capital, after the Basel III estimated corrections is above the 6% minimum 
required eve in case of zero value for the sovereign bonds of the considered country. 
So in any case a recapitalisation is not needed 
XX% the actual capital, after the Basel III estimated corrections is sufficient to reach  the 6% 
minimum required, but, in case of the reduction in value of the considered country 
sovereign bonds above XX%, a recapitalisation is needed. 
 
 Haircut for TIER1 BIII recap need to 6% 
Banks Greece  Italy  Spain  Ireland  Portugal  
Erste Group Bank AG Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG No 77% No No No 
Dexia 58% 15% No No No 
KBC Bank NV No 42% No No No 
Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd 7% No No No No 
Bank of Cyprus Public Company 
Limited-Bank of Cyprus Group 22% No No No No 
Deutsche Bank AG No No No No No 
Commerzbank AG 76% 24% 75% No No 
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 96% 20% 30% No 75% 
DZ Bank AG-Deutsche Zentral-
Genossenschaftsbank Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Bayerische Landesbank No No 87% No No 
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
NORD/LB Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Hypo Real Estate Holding AG No 54% No No No 
WestLB AG No 33% 35% No No 
HSH Nordbank AG No No No No No 
Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen GZ, 
Frankfurt Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Landesbank Berlin AG No No No No No 
DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale No No No No No 
WGZ-Bank AG Westdeutsche 
Genossenschafts-Zentralbank No 56% 60% No No 
Danske Bank A/S No No No No No 
Jyske Bank A/S (Group) No No No No No 
Sydbank A/S No No No No No 
Nykredit Bank A/S No No No No No 
Banco Santander SA Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Bankia, SAU Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
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 Haircut for TIER1 BIII recap need to 6% 
Banks Greece  Italy  Spain  Ireland  Portugal  
Barcelona-LA CAIXA 
Banco Popular Espanol SA Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Pohjola Bank plc-Pohjola Pankki Oyj No No No No No 
BNP Paribas 73% 13% 68% No No 
Crédit Agricole S.A. Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
BPCE SA Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Société Générale Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) No No No No No 
HSBC Holdings Plc No 96% No No No 
Barclays Plc No No No No No 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc No No No No No 
OTP Bank Plc No No No No No 
Allied Irish Banks plc Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Bank of Ireland Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Irish Life & Permanent Plc No No No 9% No 
Intesa Sanpaolo Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
UniCredit SpA Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Banco Popolare Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa-UBI 
Banca Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat 
Luxembourg No 23% No No No 
Bank of Valletta Plc No No No No No 
ING Bank NV Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Rabobank Nederland-Rabobank Group No No No No No 
ABN AMRO Group N.V. No No No No No 
SNS Bank N.V. No 65% No No No 
DnB NOR Bank ASA Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank 
Polski SA - PKO BP SA No No No No No 
Caixa Geral de Depositos Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-
Millennium bcp Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento, 
SA-BES Investimento Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Banco BPI SA 29% 6% No 18% 2% 
Nordea Bank AB (publ) Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB No No No No No 
Svenska Handelsbanken Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Swedbank AB No No No No No 
NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. Needed Needed Needed Needed Needed 
Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento, 
SA-BES Investimento 73% 13% 68% No No 
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